PERIÓDICOS ALIAZON: Are There Limits to US Support for Israel’s War on Hamas?

Are There Limits to US Support for Israel’s War on Hamas?

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January 3, 2024

Are There Limits to US Support for Israel's War on Hamas?

Israel's war on Hamas in Gaza, waged in response to the terrorist group's horrific Oct. 7 massacres, has produced many deaths, mass displacement, and a humanitarian crisis among Gazan civilians. Given those realities, for how long will the US back its close ally's military campaign?

In an op-ed in the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, American author and commentator David Rothkopf asks that question in stark terms: "Is our bond with Israel so great that it is, perhaps alone among all our friendships and partnerships worldwide, unconditional?" Rothkopf proposes hypotheticals: "What if Israel continues to fight on, ignoring Biden administration pleas to wind down the conflict? What if Israel continues to fight with reckless disregard for the lives of innocents and the deaths and the suffering continue to mount? Do we stop when 25,000 are dead? When 30,000 have been obliterated? When 50,000 are gone? How many dead children does it take to reconsider our policy?"

Worldwide, there is bitter contention over Israel's military campaign and the civilian death and suffering it has caused. In interviews throughout the war, Israeli officials have steadfastly insisted the Israel Defense Forces target only Hamas militants and seek to warn Gazan civilians before striking. Mass civilian casualties are the fault of Hamas, they have maintained, credibly accusing the Gaza-governing terrorist group of using innocent Palestinians as human shields. In some corners, calls for a ceasefire have been viewed as calls for Israel to be handcuffed, prevented from defending itself against a terrorist group that has vowed to repeat the atrocities of Oct. 7 if given the chance. The specter of antisemitism looms large over the discussion.

Critics of Israel, particularly in the Arab world, have accused the Jewish state of pursuing a different goal: to kill or displace Palestinians and settle Gaza with Israelis. South Africa has accused Israel of pursuing genocide, an allegation Israel denies and which it intends to fight in the International Court of Justice.

Comments by far-right ministers in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government have not helped. Two Israeli ministers drew a sharp rebuke from Washington on Tuesday: Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, for saying it would be better if Gaza were populated with fewer Arabs and more Israelis who could "make the desert bloom," and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir for telling reporters and members of his party that the war presents an "opportunity to concentrate on encouraging the migration of the residents of Gaza." In early November, Netanyahu suspended another minister for suggesting in a radio interview that a nuclear bomb could be dropped on Gaza. At Jewish Currents last month, Jonathan Shamir critiqued a November Wall Street Journal op-ed by two Israeli lawmakers calling on world governments to welcome Gazan refugees by establishing new relocation programs. "While expulsion has yet to become Israel's stated goal," Shamir wrote, "it is already becoming a reality on the ground."

For Washington's part, reports have indicated quiet US pressure on Israel to wrap up the intense phase of its campaign. Writing for Al-Arabiya, journalist and Middle East analyst David Powell saw Washington's stance shifting in late November, as previously strong "US support for the war appear(ed) less than wholehearted."

In a Foreign Affairs essay last week, Shalom Lipner warned Israel could lose its US backing in a broader sense. "Israelis have always attributed staunch U.S. support for their country to a set of shared values—including freedom, pluralism, and democracy—and interests, such as the promotion of peace and stability," Lipner wrote. "That ground is shifting now, especially as younger Americans express dramatically less affinity for Israel than older generations. (US President) Joe Biden, who has asserted often that 'you don't have to be a Jew to be a Zionist,' may well be the last Democratic president with impeccable pro-Israeli credentials. This trend should, and does, worry Israel."

On GPS in late December, The New York Times' Ezra Klein noted similarly to Fareed that in the US, a generational divide could be emerging. Older Americans know Israel as an underdog, a post-Holocaust national home for Jews defending itself against hostile neighbors. Younger Americans know only the Israel of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: powerful, dominating, and bending liberal-democratic norms. As for how Israel can move forward, in Foreign Affairs Lipner made recommendations: wage the Gaza campaign carefully and quickly, heal domestic political divisions, and find a "clear position" on Palestinian rights and statehood.

A Landmark Court Ruling—and a Fight Over Israel's Future?

Speaking of political divisions in Israel, the country's Supreme Court ruled this week against a judicial overhaul advanced by the Netanyahu government that brought mass protests to Israeli streets before the Gaza war. "The decision is likely to rekindle the grave domestic situation that began a year ago over the government's judicial overhaul plan—which sparked mass protests that brought the country to a near standstill at times—even as Israel is at war in Gaza," Isabel Kershner wrote for The New York Times.

At the same paper, Steven Erlanger sees twin battles for Israel's identity: "(T)he court and the war are connected in a way, because they are both crucial to Israel's future and future identity. Israel regards the war as existential—the best way to restore its reputation in the region as ineradicable and as a beacon of security for Jews worldwide. The court decision goes to the heart of the debate over whether Israel will remain a thriving democracy, which is vital to its special relationship with the West."

When a Stalemate Isn't a Stalemate

The war in Ukraine is effectively stalemated, top Ukrainian military commander Gen. Valery Zaluzhny told The Economist in an interview published Nov. 1. But the full story isn't so simple, some war observers have pointed out: The front lines may be static, but it's not as if Ukrainian and Russian soldiers have stopped fighting.

Noted Ukraine-war analyst Jack Watling of the UK defense think tank RUSI argues in a new Foreign Affairs essay that "(t)his perception of stalemate … is deeply flawed. Both Moscow and Kyiv are in a race to rebuild offensive combat power. In a conflict of this scale, that process will take time. While the first half of 2024 may bring few changes in control of Ukrainian territory, the materiel, personnel training, and casualties that each side accrues in the next few months will determine the long-term trajectory of the conflict. The West in fact faces a crucial choice right now: support Ukraine so that its leaders can defend their territory and prepare for a 2025 offensive or cede an irrecoverable advantage to Russia."

As speculation about a negotiated settlement seems to be percolating, Le Monde's Sylvie Kauffman writes that talking to Moscow—and, more specifically, relying on it as an honest broker—is unrealistic. It seems to be in Russian President Vladimir Putin's interest to prolong the war, as long as it doesn't cause political blowback at home, Kauffman notes. "And therein lies the trap, which the advocates of negotiation do not want to see. In his almost quarter-century in power, Putin has shown a remarkable talent for opening negotiations that never amount anything. This was the case after the invasion of Georgia in 2008 … it was especially the case with the so-called 'Normandy format' process, launched in 2014 by then- (German) Chancellor Angela Merkel and (French) President François Hollande to try to settle the conflict in the Donbas. During all these years of fruitless diplomatic talks, neither France nor Germany provided any military aid to Ukraine, since they were party to the negotiations: this was time gained for the Kremlin, which continued its military activity in Ukraine and preparations for a large-scale invasion."

A Big Question for 2024:

China's Economy

Despite hopes for a post-Covid-lockdown boom, China's economy disappointed in 2023. What will it do in 2024?

As always, the answer will have ramifications for the rest of the world, given China's massive economic heft. At CNN Business, Laura He suggests China will muddle through: "Despite its many problems—a property crisis, weak spending and high youth unemployment—most economists think the world's second largest economy will hit its official growth target of around 5% (for 2023). But that is still below the 6%-plus annual growth averaged in the decade before the Covid pandemic, and 2024 is increasingly looking ominous, they said. The country may be staring at decades of stagnation thereafter. 'The 2024 challenge for the Chinese economy will not be GDP growth—that will likely be above 4.5%,' said Derek Scissors, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a center-right think tank. 'The challenge will be that the only direction from there is down.'"

At The Guardian, George Magnus offers a bleak assessment: "The reality, though, is that systemic problems have over the years become features in China's $19 trillion economy. The real estate market has tipped over after an almost unbroken 20-year boom … At about a quarter of GDP, housing now faces years of shrinkage as it adjusts to chronic oversupply and lower household formation. Property developers, local governments and state enterprises have high levels of debt and many face debt service difficulties. The virtual absence of inflation reflects inadequate aggregate demand. Stalled productivity growth, the politicisation of regulation and the business environment, rapid ageing, high youth unemployment and inequality also figure prominently."

In a Nikkei Asia op-ed, Wei Yao and Michelle Lam predict modest improvement, suggesting much will depend on China's property sector. "(E)ven effective policy measures are likely to do no more than stabilize the (property) market, given stagnating structural demand owing to China's aging population and the slowing pace of urbanization," they write. "This means activity is still likely to be down for 2024 as a whole, but the drop should be less than that of 2023."

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