Insights, analysis and must reads from CNN's Fareed Zakaria and the Global Public Square team, compiled by Global Briefing editor Chris Good Seeing this newsletter as a forward? Sign up here. July 11, 2024 |
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Will Starmer's Labour Remake Britain? |
What will the new Labour government, under new Prime Minister Keir Starmer, change about the UK?
Last week's election result was dramatic. The Conservatives (also known as the Tories) suffered a historic defeat that ended their 14 years in power. Since before the election, left-leading commentators have lamented what Britain's economy and political system had become under Tory policies. Two weeks ahead of the vote, Tom Crewe wrote for the London Review of Books that Conservatives had presided over a series of shortsighted and devastating neoliberal erosions, like post-2008 austerity and the nationally damaging Brexit, that dealt a massive blow to economic security.
In a Foreign Affairs essay, Irish author and opinion writer Fintan O'Toole picks up the thread, noting Britain's dire straits and sharp regional inequality, wondering if Starmer can repair the country and usher in the "change" promised by Labour's one-word campaign slogan. Doubts center on the fact that Starmer has not embraced any big, bold methods—such as borrowing more, raising key tax rates, or moving to rejoin the EU.
"In 2022," O'Toole notes, "the Commission on the UK's Future, an independent body chaired by former Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown, found that on the simple measure of GDP per capita, 'half the British population … live in areas no wealthier than the poorer parts of the former East Germany, poorer than parts of central and eastern Europe, and poorer than the U.S. states of Mississippi and West Virginia.' … Almost all the country's public services … are struggling. The country urgently needs massive amounts of public investment. But Labour has accepted the fiscal restraints it has inherited from the Conservatives … Squaring that circle will be so hard that Starmer may well feel that large-scale political reforms are a luxury he cannot afford."
To O'Toole, part of the answer indeed lies in political reform: devolving more power to Britain's national and local governments. He notes that Labour's big win did not correspond to any overwhelming share of the national vote—the party collected 34%—so Starmer may lack the political capital to make drastic changes. Others point to Starmer's reserved public persona and wonder about his appetite for boldness in governing: In a New Statesman essay, Edward Docx notes "a disconnect between the reputedly genial friend and the somewhat stand-offish, stolid, leader."
In the eyes of some, Labour will need to make big changes—and achieve big results—in order to sustain itself politically. The Spectator's political editor, Katy Balls, writes that even after their landslide win, some in the Labour Party "still felt a sense of unease. 'This majority is a mile wide and an inch deep,' said one new MP. 'Lots of these wins are very slight.' Already Labour strategists are worried about the next election. 'If we don't deliver, we will be out.' The fear is that the same wave of anti-government sentiment which led Starmer to Downing Street could quickly turn against Labour. As one frontbencher in a northern seat put it: 'The threat from the [far-right populist] Reform party could become our problem.' ... Despite the scale of Labour's majority, Starmer knows he does not yet command the public's trust. His plan is to respond with action. With no real room to borrow or spend more, the only way to do that is with reform." |
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The story remains the same, but it grows more intense with each passing day: President Joe Biden faces calls to step aside and allow another Democrat to seek the White House, but so far he has defied them. The Economist portrays nervous Democrats as facing a game-theory conundrum: "Democrats find themselves with a collective-action problem. If an individual comes out for Mr Biden to stand aside, but others do not, they will have harmed their party's nominee and their own career, to [former President Donald] Trump's benefit. This bind explains the indecision of the past weeks: the agonising private meetings that yield little consensus, the public statements of either feigned confidence or diplomatic concerns. If the president is not for turning, then what is there to be done? When confronted with irrationality from the top, rational actors in the party ranks can be forced to submit. That has been the story of the Republican Party under Mr Trump." |
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Is Iran's Supreme Leader 'Worried'? |
At The Atlantic, Arash Azizi suggests he is. In Iran's recent presidential-election runoff, reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian handily defeated his conservative rival. But elections in Iran are not considered free or fair; a Guardian Council vets candidates, notoriously disqualifying reformists, and Pezeshkian himself was barred in 2021, the BBC notes in an explanatory profile of the new president.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has succeeded in filling his government with conservative hardliners, his own ideological kin. So why let Pezeshkian run (and win)? Azizi proposes an answer: "Khamenei has to be aware that the societal base for his regime is only shrinking. The mix of political repression and economic failure has proved unsurprisingly unpopular. A majority of Iranians refused to vote not only in this election but also in the three elections before it, starting in 2020." To Azizi, Pezeshkian's rise might reflect a recognition by Khamenei that things have not gone well under the current order dominated by his hardline ideological allies. Azizi concludes: "Just five years ago, on the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, he spoke of cultivating a government dominated by 'devout young revolutionaries.' By opening up the political space to technocrats and centrists, he is perhaps admitting the defeat of that dream." |
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Gathering this week in Washington, NATO leaders have been forced to ponder a slew of challenges, The Atlantic Council's Frederick Kempe has written: deepened coordination among adversaries, the erosion of democracy globally, and "insufficient recognition among NATO's thirty-two members of the gravity of the historic moment, reflected in their still-inadequate backing for Ukraine."
The alliance's identity and purpose may or may not be added to that list. At the dovish publication Responsible Statecraft, Anatol Lieven writes: "During the 75 years of NATO's existence, there really have been three NATOs: two with the mission of containing Russia, separated by one which thrashed around wildly and disastrously in search of a new mission." (In Lieven's view, the threat Russia poses today is "largely imaginary," and bigger problems consist of climate change, migration and "neo-liberal economic policies.")
If this is a third iteration of NATO, Stephen M. Walt writes for Foreign Policy that in its new era, NATO's internal problems are its most menacing. The rises of Trump in the US and far-right leader Marine Le Pen in France threaten the ethos of transatlantic cooperation, Walt notes. "NATO is in trouble precisely because it has lasted so long and the familiar cliches about shared values and trans-Atlantic solidarity do not resonate as powerfully as they once did, especially for younger generations. … I doubt NATO will collapse, even if Trump becomes president again and more NATO skeptics gain power in Europe. But there are powerful structural forces gradually pulling Europe and the United States apart, and those trends will continue regardless of what happens in November, in Ukraine, or in Europe itself." |
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